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A well-known New York Times columnist, whose last journalistic
venture into the affairs of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, consisted in a
rapturous ode to the Pittsburgh Pirates baseball team, recently addressed
himself to a more prosaic problem. In a column headlined "Pittsburgh:
The Darker Side of the Golden Triangle," James Reston wrote:
The promise of spring is on the Pittsburgh hills today. The
willows stand out soft and green on the grim and wrinkled river
slopes, like daffodils scattered on a slag heap. The spectacular
roller coaster highways hum with traffic above the Golden Tri-
angle, and the sky is stained with copper-colored iron oxide
smoke from the great steel mills along the Ohio. Yet Pittsburgh
is not exactly in a hopeful springlike mood. It is a crippled giant,
immensely powerful but chained by unemployment, potentially
a vast unified industrial empire stretching up the river valleys,
but actually a politically divided complex of almost 200 different
municipal authorities. All the political, economic and social
problems of urbanized and industrialized America are drama-
tized here: the conflict of men and machines, the conflict of city
and suburban governments, the waste of idle men and machines,
the paradox of too few skilled workers and too many unskilled
workers in the increasingly automatic factories.1
It is doubtful whether the complex of almost 200 different municipal
authorities in Allegheny County has anything to do with unemployment.
But it is certain that Mr. Reston has, in these words, touched on a key
issue concerning local government in this and in a great many other
metropolitan regions in the country. E. A. Gutkind would easily extend
the problem beyond national boundaries: "That administrative boundaries
can be a great hindrance is well known. The problem has been demon-
strated in the incorporation of numerous outer communities in the metro-
politan areas of Greater London, Greater New York, Greater Paris,
Greater Berlin, Greater Tokyo, and in many other cases."' Moreover, he
feels, national governments-the "State"-have increasingly failed
throughout history to remove the hindrance.
* Chief Planner I, Comprehensive Planning Division, Boston Redevelopment Authority;
Deputy Planning Coordinator, 1975 World Freedom Fair Corp., Boston, Mass.
1. Wednesday, April 3, 1963; 46:3.
2. GUTKlm, TnE TWiLIGHT OF CrrIns 46 (1962).
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True, he says, in some countries the State has taken a certain
interest in city development, as, for instance, in England or the
U.S.S.R. But these activities can hardly be compared to the
great achievements of the past. They are more or less restricted
to financial support, a few administrative remedies, and other
minor alleviations. The cities and towns have been thrown back
upon their own initiative and the competition between them
makes schemes on a regional scale impossible.'
This is the nub of the problem. How is a city to go about performing
its traditional functions of satisfying certain needs of its inhabitants when
the inhabitants' needs know no jurisdictional boundaries and when the
needs to be satisfied are regional in nature and have no particular ties
with one city or another? What, in any case, is a "city"? If it is anything
like a nation or a state within our federal system, why can it not lay
claim to its own sphere of interests without constantly being forced by
other power groups of all sorts and at all levels to redefine its sphere of
interest? The answer, of course, is that a city is nothing like a nation
or a state. It is a subdivision of the state, among many subdivisions. At
the beginning of 1956 Pennsylvania had 6000 of these hybrid, ill-defined
municipal units. There were 941 boroughs, 50 cities, 67 counties, one
incorporated town, 73 first class townships, 1496 second class townships,
2436 school districts, 66 institutional districts and about 1000 author-
ities.' The political map of Allegheny County has been described as:
an incredible crazy quilt: the 15 largest units (in terms of land
area) cover one-half of the county, but, at the other extreme,
45 units occupy less than 1.0 square mile each, and two other
fragments are pieces of boroughs which straddle the county
line.... Inequalities of this character are not unknown to other
metropolitan areas, but in the case of Allegheny County, the
political fragmentation of the area has made it almost inevitable
that extreme inequalities would occur. Furthermore, this frag-
mentation is not necessarily tending to get any better; in fact,
new incorporations continue to occur; some of these result in the
creation of additional new units.5
To mention but one outcome of the jurisdictional fragmentation of
Allegheny County:
Not only do real property tax rates in the community ... vary
from a high effective rate of 3.83 percent in Wall to a low rate of
3. Id. at 70.
4. HANCOCK, Pennsylvania Local Government, PA. STAT. ANm. tit. 53, §§ 1-3500, p. 43
(1957).
5. PICKARD, CHANGING LAND USES AS AFFECTED BY TAXATION 36 (1962).
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1.28 percent in Lincoln (including school, municipal and county
tax rates combined)-a variation of more than 3 to 1, but a
flock of added local taxes has succeeded in creating a confused
local tax jungle-a veritable hodge-podge of per capita "head"
taxes, earned income taxes, personal property (levied also by
the county), mercantile, amusement, deed transfer, trailer, me-
chanical devices, and occupation taxes-all levied locally-some
by municipal taxing bodies, some by school districts; in some
areas by both-and in adjoining areas, by neither.... Only the
boroughs of Homestead, West Homestead and East Pittsburgh
-all old, well-established industrial enclaves-levied solely the
real property tax in 1960; the 126 other jurisdictions in Alle-
gheny County had at least one or more additional non-property
taxes.6
Problems arising in this context, broadly within the ambit of "regional
planning," are manifold. "There is almost no uniformity among the
zoning, subdivision, and building controls that are operative throughout
a metropolitan area," according to Martin Meyerson.7
As a result there is frequently a mixture of land uses that is un-
sightly and costly; there are severe diseconomies to the builder,
who cannot easily assemble land in quantity or build to con-
sistent specifications; and finally, there is an inequitable alloca-
tion of housing and community facilities. There is no doubt
that suburban zoning, subdivision and building regulations help
maintain the density of the central cities by making access to
new residential areas more difficult.8
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT AND ANNEXATION
It is thought that certain changes in the law would assist regional
planning in Pittsburgh, as elsewhere, and remove some of the barriers
to the city's general well-being such as the tax and building regulations
"hodge-podge." Among the alternative courses of action that could be
taken by the General Assembly the most obvious is the process of annexa-
tion and consolidation of municipalities. If there are so many municipali-
ities and if by sheer force of numbers they frustrate rational government,
why not reduce their numbers? Why not, in short, consolidate Pittsburgh
and the other 128 governing entities in Allegheny County into one metro-
politan government? The state Bureau of Municipal Affairs reported in
1959 that the General Assembly was indeed adopting legislation easing the
annexation process for certain political subdivisions "which are inter-
6. Id. at 40.
7. MEYERSON, TERRETT and WHEATON, HOUSING, PEOPLE AND CITIES 318 (1962).
8. Ibid.
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ested in this procedure," but all the acts listed were restricted to bor-
oughs and third class cities? Nothing in the nature of metropolitan gov-
ernment was contemplated for a city of Pittsburgh's size and complexity,
where the need would conceivably be the greatest.
The Commonwealth, nonetheless, evidenced some concern for con-
solidation in big-city areas when it was resolved, by the Act of Feb. 2,
1854, P.L. 16, that:
§ 1 ... the corporate name of the mayor, alderman and citizens
of Philadelphia shall be changed to "The City of Philadelphia,"
and the boundaries of the said city shall be extended so as to
embrace the whole of the territ6ry of the county of Philadelphia,
and all the powers of the said corporation, as enlarged and
modified by this act, shall be exercised, and have effect within
the said county and over the inhabitants thereof.
§ 6 ... the city of Philadelphia as established by this act, shall
be vested with all the power, rights, privileges and immunities
incident to a municipal corporation and necessary for the proper
government of the same.
On November 7, 1922, Article XV of the constitution-"Cities and City
Charters"-was amended to read:
§ 1 Home Rule for Cities
Cities may be chartered whenever a majority of the electors
of any town or borough having a population of at least ten
thousand shall vote at any general or municipal election in
favor of the same. Cities, or cities of any particular class, may
be given the right and power to frame and adopt their own
charters and to exercise the powers and authority of local
self-government, subject, however, to such restrictions, limita-
tions, and regulations as may be imposed by the Legislature.
Laws may also be enacted affecting the organization and
government of cities and boroughs, which shall become effective
in any city or borough only when submitted to the electors
thereof, and approved by a majority of those voting thereon.
Philadelphia adopted its "home rule" charter on April 17, 1951, effective
January 7, 1852, pursuant to the provisions of the First Class City
Home Rule Act of April 21, 1949, P.L. 665, 53 P.S. § 13101:
Cities empowered to adopt and amend charters.
Any city of the first class may frame ind adopt a charter for
9. CommONWEALTHr OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, INTERNAL
AFFAIRS, monthly bulletin, Vol. 27, Nos. 8-9, Aug.-Sept. 12-13 (1959).
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its own government and may amend its charter whether the
same has been originally adopted under the provisions of this
act or provided by local, special or general law.
Soon thereafter came the final consolidation of all governmental functions
in the city and county of Philadelphia, by constitutional amendment of
November 6, 1951:
Article XIV, section 8. City and County of Philadelphia;
Consolidation of governmental functions; County officers
abolished.
(1) In Philadelphia all county officers are hereby abolished,
and the city shall henceforth perform all functions of county
government within its area through officers selected in such
manner as may be provided by law.
(2) Local and special laws regulating the affairs of the city
of Philadelphia and creating officers or prescribing the powers
and duties of officers of the city of Philadelphia, shall be valid
notwithstanding the provisions of section seven of article three
of this Constitution.
(3) All laws applicable to the county of Philadelphia shall
apply to the city 'of Philadelphia.
(4) The city of Philadelphia shall have, assume and take
over all powers, property, obligations and indebtedness of the
county of Philadelphia....
The residents of Philadelphia now have their own charter, home rule,
and to the extent that they are relieved of city-county jurisdictional
complications, some measure of metropolitan government. But how
much has their situation really changed? Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Chief Justice Bell, in Cali v. City of Philadelphia,' doubted that the
change was very significant:
When the city-county consolidation amendment of 1951, i.e.
Article XIV, Section 8, was adopted, very many citizens of
Philadelphia believed they were authorized to adopt their own
unrestricted Home Rule Charter, and when they adopted their
Home Rule Charter they undoubtedly believed that they were
securing for themselves what they had long sought and what
the Legislature had for years denied them, namely, full and
complete home rule so far as local officers, local conditions and
affairs and local self-government were concerned. Unfortunately
the hereinbefore quoted provisions of the Constitution, and as
we shall see the Enabling Act, i.e., the First Class City Home
Rule Act of 1949, supra, which authorized and limited the
10. 406 Pa. 290, 177 A.2d 824 (1962).
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Charter's very existence make clear that they acquired no such
absolute and unconditional untrammeled right. Although this
is clear and indisputable, it is so often overlooked or emotionally
glossed over that we shall repeat: the Constitution granted and
reserved to the Legislature and the Legislature in turn, in
granting home rule to Philadelphia, i.e., the right to frame and
adopt a Charter, clearly and specifically reserved to itself the
power to impose restrictions, limitations and regulations on
any First Class City Home Rule Charter."
Justice Bell was here merely echoing the opinion of Judge Sharswood
of the state supreme court in Philadelphia v. Fox, 2 decided in 1870. The
court there articulated, in reference to Philadelphia, a well-entrenched
rule of law pertaining to all municipal subdivisions in Pennsylvania:
The city of Philadelphia ... is merely an agency instituted by
the sovereign for the purpose of carrying out in detail the
objects of government-essentially a revocable agency-having
no vested right to any of its powers or franchises-the charter
or act of erection being in no sense a contract with the state---
and therefore fully subject to the control of the legislature, who
may enlarge or diminish its territorial extent or its functions,
may change or modify its internal arrangement, or destroy its
very existence, with the mere breath of arbitrary discretion.
Sic volo, sic jubeo, that is all the sovereign authority need say.
The Legislature of this Commonwealth, under the Constitution,
could not by contract invest any municipal corporation with an
irrevocable franchise of government over any part of its terri-
tory. It cannot alienate any part of the legislative power which,
by the Constitution, is vested in a General Assembly annually
convened . . . . If the Legislature were to attempt to erect a
municipality with a special provision that its charter should be
unchangeable or irrevocable, such provision would be a nullity.
Such political institutions (municipalities) have not and cannot
have any vested rights as against the state."
The same view was reiterated in even stronger terms by the leading case
of Commonwealth v. Moir,"4 where Judge Mitchell said:
Municipal corporations are agents of the state, invested with
certain subordinate governmental functions for reasons of
11. Id. at 297-8, 177 A.2d at 828.
12. 64 Pa. 169 (1870).
13. Id. at 180-181.
14. 199 Pa. 534, 49 At!. 351 (1901).
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convenience and public policy. They are created, governed,
and the extent of their powers determined, by the legislature,
and subject to change, repeal, or total abolition at its will. They
have no vested rights in their offices, their charters, their
corporate existence, or their corporate powers. This is the
universal rule of constitutional law, and in no state has it been
more clearly expressed and more uniformly applied than in
Pennsylvania.' 5
Still, Philadelphia has the right under its charter to handle its administra-
tive affairs without fear of intervention from the General Assembly.
The disinction was drawn by Chief Justice Stern, in Lennox v. Clark,'6
in the following terms:
The limitations of power referred to in section 18 (of the First
Class City Home Rule Act) concern only laws in relation to
substantive matters of State-wide concern, such as health,
s afety, security and general welfare of all the inhabitants of
the State, and not to matters affecting merely the personnel and
administrators of the offices local to Philadelphia and which are
of no concern to citizens elsewhere. Any other conclusion would
reduce the Charter to a mere scrap of paper and make the much
heralded grant of Philadelphia home rule an illusion and a
nullity."
Going back to the original question of metropolitan government and
Pennsylvania's experience in that area, it would seem on the basis of
developments in Philadelphia that nothing substantial has been accom-
plished since the enactment of the city-county consolidation act of
1854. Whether, even then, it eliminated problems of the nature and
scope now confronting Pittsburgh and Allegheny County is open to
question. But it cannot be gainsaid that one problem, however minor,
was eliminated: The county of Philadelphia can never be at odds with
the city of Philadelphia, for they are one and the same.
Pittsburgh, meanwhile, has had its own opportunities to acquire
metropolitan home rule privileges from the Commonwealth. By constitu-
tional amendment of November 6, 1928 and November 7, 1933 section
4-"Power of Legislature to provide for consolidated city and county
Comprising County of Allegheny, and municipalities therein"--was added
to Article XV:
The General Assembly is hereby authorized to provide for the
15. Id. at 541, 49 AtI. at 352; cf. Lighton v. Abington Tp., 336 Pa. 345, 9 A.2d 609
(1939) and Shirk v. Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 162, 169 AtI. 557 (1933).
16. 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1954).
17; Id. at 379, 93 A.2d at 844.
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consolidation of the county, poor districts, cities, boroughs and
townships of the county of Allegheny, and the offices thereof,
into a consolidated city and county, with the constitutional and
legal capacity of a municipal corporation, to be known either as
"Greater Pittsburgh," or "Metropolitan Pittsburgh" or "City
of Pittsburgh (Metropolitan)," and to provide for a charter for
its government, and to fix the name thereof in the charter. The
said charter shall be submitted to the electors of said county
at a special or general election to be provided for therein. If
the majority of the electors voting thereon in the county as a
whole, and at least a majority of the electors voting thereon in
each of a majority of the cities, boroughs and townships thereof,
vote in the affirmative, the act shall take effect for the whole
county.
If rejected, the said charter may be resubmitted by the county
commissioners to the electors from time to time, but not oftener
than once in two years, until adopted....
It shall be competent, subject to the police power of the
State, for the Legislature to provide in said charter:
VI. For the assesment of property for taxation, the levying
and collecting of taxes, and the payment of the cost of any
public or municipal improvement, in whole or in part, by special
assessment upon abutting and non-abutting property specially
benefited thereby.
VII. For the creation, by the board of commissioners, of dis-
tricts for the purpose of regulating the location, height, area,
bulk and use of buildings and premises. ...
VIII .....
IX. For the creation, by the board of commissioners, of special
districts for the purpose of carrying on or carrying out any
public or municipal improvement, not for the exclusive benefit
of any one municipal division. ...
X. For the exercise of such powers by the consolidated city as
may be necessary to enable it to carry on and carry out such
municipal and metropolitan powers and functions as the
General Assembly may deem advisable and expedient and for
the general welfare of the said city and its inhabitants:
Provided, however, that it is the intent of this section that
substantial powers be reserved to the cities, boroughs and town-
ships situated in Allegheny County. To this end the charter
shall provide for the continued existence of the said cities,
boroughs and townships, as municipal divisions and forms of
[Vol. 5:353
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government, subject to the laws now or hereafter provided for
government of municipalities of their respective forms and
classes and to the powers conferred upon the consolidated city
by the charter, and with their present boundaries. Any two
or more of said municipal divisions, or portions thereof, may,
with the consent of a majority of the electors voting thereon in
each of such divisions at any special or general election, be
united to form a single municipal division. Wherever a portion
of a municipal division is involved, the election shall be held in
the entire municipal division of which the said portion is a
part.
The said municipal divisions shall have and continue to have
the following powers:
V. All other powers not specifically granted by the charter to
the consolidated city: Provided, however, that a municipal
division may surrender, by a majority vote of the electors
voting thereon at any general or special election, any of its
powers to the consolidated city, subject to the acceptance there-
of by the board of commissioners.
Under these provisions and pursuant to the Act of 1929, April 8, P.L.
603 the three commissioners of Allegheny County submitted to the
county electors at a special election on June 25, 1929, the question of
the adoption of a proposed charter for the "consolidated city of Pitts-
burgh." It was rejected. The Metropolitan Plan Commission thereupon
requested the commissioners to resubmit the question at the November,
1929, election or as soon as possible thereafter, but the State Supreme
Court, in O'Connor v. Armstrong,"s (1930), thwarted their attempt.
According to Judge Simpson only the General Assembly had the power
to resubmit the charter for adoption. The commissioners "were without
power in the premises" and were accordingly enjoined "from proceeding
further in the matter."' 9 The present status of metropolitan home rule
in Pittsburgh is set forth in the report of the Metropolitan Study
Commission, created by the General Assembly in May, 1951, "to
promote the uniform development of Allegheny County."0
The Commission decided that constant changes occurring in a
growing metropolitan area require changes in governmental
activities. It believes these changes could best be achieved by
18. 299 Pa. 390, 149 At. 655 (1930).
19. Id. at 657; cf. In re City of Pittsburgh's City Charter, 297 Pa. 502, 147 At. 524
(1929).
20. Report of the Metropolitan Study Commission, a summary of this Commission's
269-page report, reprinted from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and distributed by the Pittsburgh
Chamber of Commerce 1 (1955).
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permitting voters of the County to make necessary amendments
to the charter under which they are governed. "After con-
sidering various alternative approaches to the provision of an
adequate governmental structur.e for the Allegheny County
metropolitan area," the Commission said, it "concludes and
recommends that the State Constitution be amended so as to
permit the voters of Allegheny County to draft and adopt a
home rule charter. . . ." This constitutional amendment, to be
known as the "Urban Home Rule Charter Amendment," would
grant to Allegheny County all powers and authority of local
self-government and would provide for a form of County
government and for the exercise of any and all powers relating
to its functions .... Enactment of a constitutional amendment
would require approval of two successive Legislatures and a
state-wide referendum. The proposed new charter would also
have to be submitted to a referendum -of the County's voters.2'
The chances of success for such a scheme are practically non-existent.
The Pennsylvania Commission on Constitutional Revision reported in
1959 that:
The General Assembly has been reluctant to approve recommen-
dations for change in the Constitution. This -is especially evident
from the record of the past 30 years. In that time a total of 837
joint resolutions to amend the Constitution have been intro-
duced. Only 285 received sufficient consideration to be reported
from committee and just 117 were approved at-least once by
both House and Senate. Of the .38 that finally reached the
voters, 26 were approved. Attempts at a general revision of ,the
present Constitution through constitutional conventions have had
no success. The five times that the question of holding a con-
vention has been submitted to the people have all resulted in
heavy defeats.22
It concluded that the best means of effectuatiig the advisable changes
in the Constitution is by amendment. The argument has been advanced
elsewhere, however, that the Commission, in proposing the achievement
of its reform program by "piecemeal amendment," is bound to. meet
"insuperable difficulties.- Even if the commission should accomplish the
unbelieveable feat of persuading the General Assembly to pass through
two successive sessions the bulk of its proposals, it would have before
it the far more difficult task of awakening public interest and persuading
the voters to cast a vote on a bewildering long list of amendments. 2 3
21. Id. at 24.
22:: PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, Report, 1959, 10-11.
23 BRANNING, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 156 (1960).
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The whole idea of metropolitan government may be a source of be-
wilderment to voters, and that in itself may constitute a barrier to popular
acceptance. Scott Greer, speaking of efforts to create metropolitan
governments in St. Louis and Pittsburgh since 1933, notes that "in
the intervening twenty-eight years dozens of efforts have been made to
recreate the governmental form of the city in a metropolitan image;
until 1957 there was not one single success. . . .Both the record of
consistent failure," he said, "and the continuing efforts at change are
impressive regularities."24 In his opinion the opposition to metropolitan
government is rationalized in many ways:
Major themes, appearing over and over again, are these: fear of
the unknown (big government), caution ("why rock the boat?"
"leave well enough alone"), loyalty to, and pride of place in, the
existing city, suspicion that the city will get the short end of the
bargain, political suspicion of the crusading outsiders, who are
not a part of the team and whose campaign comes close to
condemnation of the existing government.
25
In the suburbs, Greer says, the opposition is more diffuse and less
professional, but:
It will be rationalized in ways quite similar to those of central
city opponents. Fear of the unknown, caution, loyalty to a
suburban municipality, combine with fear that the city will
dominate the new government and thus the suburbs. . . . In
city and suburbs alike the leaders are easily convinced that
"the others" will get the better of the bargain.
26
Perhaps a more justifiable ground for opposition lies in the fact,
pointed out by Professor Meyerson in reference to multiple housing
controls, that:
This problem would not necessarily be quickly solved if there
existed a metropolitan government. Housing measures-such
as relocation or a change in density-which are politically in-
feasible on an intercity basis do not become feasible merely by
enlarging the area. Furthermore, the imposition of minimum,.,
standards throughout a metropolitan area may easily go beyond
their necessary purpose of safeguarding the health and safety
of the community to infringe on the essential freedom of the
individual by requiring him to buy more housing and related
facilities than he wants. 7
24.- GREER, Tnx EMERGING CITY 181 (1962).
25. Id. at 185.
26. Ibid.
27. MEYERSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 318.
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Similar considerations could conceivably apply in other areas where
urban jurisdictional complexes are thought to hamper progress. There is,
at any rate, a pattern of legislative permissiveness coupled with public,
or political intransigence. City dwellers seem reluctant to do what the
law, in all its flexibility (or is it ambiguity?) actually encourages
them to do. The people balk at regional government even where the law
eggs them on.
Such was the case when the old city of Allegheny was consolidated
with Pittsburgh in 1906. The state supreme court in Sample v. City of
Pittsburgh,28 invalidated the Act of April 20, 1905, P.L. 161, enabling
the cities of Allegheny and Pittsburgh to consolidate, on the grounds
that it was "special legislation" in violation of section 7 (2) or Article III
of the constitution. The General Assembly, in a special session, met the
court's objections promptly wth the enactment of the Act of February
7, 1906, P.L. 1, and by its provisions both the state supreme court in
In re City of Pittsburgh, Appeal of Hunter,29 and the United States
Supreme Court, in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh," sanctioned the con-
solidation. The General Assembly had originally provided in 1905 that:
§ 1 . . . Where two cities situate in the same county, are or
may be contiguous to each other, the city having the smaller
population, as shown by the last preceding United States census,
may be annexed to the city having the larger population....
For the purpose of this act, cities separated by a stream, river
or highway, shall be included under the term contiguous....
§ 4 If it shall appear by the vote ... that a majority of all the
qualified electors of the two cities . . . have voted in favor of
annexation, the said court of quarter sessions shall enter a
decree annexing the smaller city . . . to the larger city . .. but
if a majority ... have voted against annexation, the proceeding
shall be dismissed, and the question of annexation shall not
again be submitted to the vote of the electors for a period of less
than one year from the date of said election.
Judge Mestreza, in the Sample case, based his holding of unconstitu-
tionality on the settled rule that:
The test whether a statute is local and special legislation within
the prohibition of the Constitution is whether it operates upon
all counties or cities alike, and, when they are properly classified,
it acts upon all counties or cities of the same class alike . .
28. 212 Pa. 533, 62 At. 20 (1905).
29. 217 Pa. 227, 66 At. 348 (1907).
30. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
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The court will look at the substance and not the form of legisla-
tion . . . As we take judicial cognizance of the municipal
divisions of the state, as well as of their location, we know...
that the cities of Allegheny and Pittsburgh .. . are the only two
contiguous cities in the state and that there are no two contiguous
cities in any other county in the state. The act, therefore, is
limited in its operation to these two cities, and the effect or
result of the legislation is the same, and the act as clearly special
as if the names of the two cities had been written in the statute.".
The corrected statute of 1906, entitled "An act to enable cities that
are now, or may hereafter be, contiguous or in close proximity, to be
united, with any intervening land other than boroughs, in one munici-
pality; providing for the consequences of such consolidation, the
temporary government of the consolidated city, payment of the indebted-
ness of each of the united territories, and the enforcement of debts and
claims due to or from each other," provided that:
§ 1 . . . Wherever, in this Commonwealth, now or hereafter,
two cities shall be contiguous or in close proximity to each other,
the two, with any intervening land other than boroughs, may
be united and become one by annexing and consolidating the
lesser city, and the intervening land other than boroughs, if any,
with the greater city, and thus making one consolidated city, if
at an election ... there shall be a majority of all the votes cast in
favor of such union. 2
The two statutes were then compared by Judge Brown in In re City of
Pittsburgh:
At this point it may be well to call attention to the clear line
of demarcation between this act, and that of April 20, 1905,
P.L. 221, known as the 'Cook Law,' and declared to be uncon-
stitutional in Sample v. Pittsburgh33. . . . So clearly was it bald,
special, local legislation that it might well have been labeled an
act for the consolidation of the cities of Pittsburgh and Alle-
gheny.
Turning to the Act of 1906, he stated:
Whether two cities ought to be consolidated is purely a legisla-
tive question, and the general act providing for their consolida-
tion is not forbidden legislation. The power of the legislature
to provide for the annexation of cities is not limited by the
constitution. What it may not now do is to regulate, by a local
31. 212 Pa. at 539-542, 62 At!. at 204-205.
32. 217 Pa. at 231-236, 66 At. at 350-352.
33. Citations omitted.
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or special law, the affairs of cities. In providing for the annexa-
tion of any two cities of the Commonwealth there is no
regulation of the affairs of any two particular cities. The
provision is simply for such annexation, if certain, natural,
and, what may be regarded as necessary conditions exist.
The legislature may ... have provided for the consolidation of
cities without regard to the distance between them, absorbing
in their consolidation all the intervening space, whether occupied
by boroughs or townships. But such legislation is not conceiv-
able; for the common sense of the people would not tolerate
it....
But what of this act? Its operation is not confined "to cities
within certain territorial limits." It is general in its terms and
refers to no classes of cities, but to all cities. It does not pro-
vide that it shall operate only "upon two cities situated in the
same county." It does not exclude from its provisions and deny
its privileges to all cities separated by a county line, or which
are not wholly within the same county; but extends them to
any two cities within the Commonwealth having natural, reason-
able and necessary conditions of consolidation....
It may meet at the time of its passage the wants of but one
community, but, if in the future it will meet these same wants
in all other communities, the legislation is as general as if at
the time of its passage there had been no special reason calling
for it.34
The Act of 1905 was unconstitutional and the Act of 1906 was
constitutional. Yet both would have accomplished the same end result
with the same political repercussions. And in fact, the same parties met
before the United States Supreme Court with the same arguments for and
against consolidation. It would appear that, as Judge Brown put it,
"restraints on the legislative power of control must be found in the
Constitution of the State, or they must rest alone in the legislative
discretion. If the legislative action operates injuriously to the munici-
palities or to individuals, the remedy is not with the courts. The courts
have no power to interfere, and the people must be looked to, to right
through the ballot box all these wrongs."3 5 Then would it not be fair to
ask whether the grounds for the decisions in In re Pittsburgh and the
Sample case were technically sufficient but politically-that is, prac-
tically-irrelevant?
The "wrongs" referred to by Judge Brown show up in Justice
34. 221 Pa. 533, 62 AtI. 201 (1906).
35. Id. at 236, 352.
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Moody's discussion of the controversy in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.
So also do the available remedies:
If the city of Allegheny should be annexed to the city of
Pittsburgh, the taxpayers of Allegheny . . . will, in addition to
the payment of taxes necessary to pay and liquidate their own
indebtedness, have to bear and pay their proportion of the new
indebtedness that must necessarily be created to acquire the
facilities, properties, and improvements . . . in Pittsburgh; all
of which would be of no benefit to the citizens and taxpayers
of Allegheny....
At the election a majority of all the voters of the two cities
approved the consolidation. It is agreed that the majoriy of
the voters of the city of Allegheny voted against the consolida-
tion, but that majority was overcome by a larger majority of
the voters of the city of Pittsburgh in favor of the consolida-
tion....
We have nothing to do with the policy, wisdom, justice or
fairness of the act under consideration; those questions are for
the consideration of those to whom the state has entrusted
its legislative power, and their determination of them is not
subject to review or criticism by this court....
The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw
all such powers, may take without compensation such property,
hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the
territorial area, unite the whole or part of it with another
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation.
All this may be done conditionally or unconditionally, with or
without the consent of the citizens, or even against their pro-
test. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative
body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it
will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the
United States. Although the inhabitants and property owners
may, by such changes, suffer inconvenience, and their property
may be lessened in value by the burden of increased taxation,
or for any other reason, they have no right, by contract or
otherwise, in the unaltered or continued existence of the corpo-
ration or its powers, and there is nothing in the Federal Con-
stitution which protects them from these injurious consequences.
The power is in the state, and those who legislate for the state
are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of
it.36
36. 207 U.S. 161, 174-181 (1907).
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Again, in Troop v. City of Pittsburgh,3 7 a case arising from the
Allegheny-Pittsburgh consolidation, Judge Swearingen stated that it
is:
Well settled by authority ... that the legislature had power to
transfer liability for the pre-existing indebtedness of the con-
stituent units of the greater city to the latter .... It is a purely
legislative question. Consolidation of municipalities and annex-
ation of one municipality to another are not prohibited by the
constitution. The legislature may authorize such consolidation
and annexation upon such terms as it may see fit to impose.
The law of annexation in Pennsylvania, on the basis of these proceed-
ings, may be stated thus: The General Assembly may do much as it
pleases, so long as it does not enact "special or local" legislation. But
to the majority of voters of Allegheny who opposed consolidation with
Pittsburgh it might just as well be stated instead: The General Assembly
may do much as it pleases. It may even be supposed that under the
circumstances the voters of Allegheny would have welcomed "special
legislation" protecting their territorial and political integrity. Failing
that, they could not otherwise hope to find solace in the courts.
But for reasons which should be clear by now, municipalities of any
size or importance are in scant danger of losing their political integrity
by way of annexation. The courts evidently are most anxious to follow
the legislature in such matters and the legislature, bound as it is by
public opinion, is faced with the public's efforts to make the law of
annexation in Pennsylvania the law against annexation. These are some
of the fundamental reasons why Pittsburgh cannot hope to achieve regional
government through annexation. If it would take a long time to classify
each municipality in Allegheny County, it would take even longer to
mention here the various statutes under which annexation procedures are
regulated. The situation is summed up by Dr. Hancock in his discussion
of "Metropolitan Expansion:"
The physical limits of most larger metropolitan subdivisions
have been reached and it is only the most rural of local govern-
ment units that does not have this problem facing it. This in
Pennsylvania is more generally known as the annexation prob-
lem. Because each political subdivision has its own legislative
powers, it follows that the procedure for annexing territory varies
according to the class of subdivision. . . Because it is most
difficult to find independent governing units willing to relinquish
their sovereignty, the record is void in recent times of any city
having annexed a borough under this procedure. Other cities
37. 254 Pa. 172, 98 Atl. 1034, 1036 (1916).
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cannot annex any part of a borough unless three-fifths of the
inhabitants petition and with the approval of the borough
council. (1931, June 23, P.L. 932, 53 P.S. § 35101 et seq.)
Most annexing activity involves townships. At one time the
procedure for acquiring land from these jurisdictions was
relatively simple. Then, a borough or city merely had to secure
a petition from a majority of the property owners wanting to be
annexed. In 1937, however, the First Class Township Code
was amended to require that the question of losing territory
would have to be approved by all the electors in the township.
(1937, July 2, P.L. 2803, No. 588; 53 P.S. § 59101 et seq.).
No such approval has been granted although several elections
have been held throughout the state on the question. Residents
in a township residing close to a borough or city might want to
become part of the larger municipality but the other residents of
the township usually take a position opposing the move. The
"left-behinders" are fearful that the loss of territory will pro-
duce added financial burdens on them and consistently vote
against the idea. Consequently, the first class townships are
enjoying complete immunity from losing territory to cities and
boroughs. Second class townships have attempted to secure
the same legislative immunity but have failed. Therefore,
second class townships faced with the loss of territory change
their classification to first class. A constant cry from the second
class townships for protection from what they call "land grabs"
by boroughs and cities has found some support in the Legis-
lature. 38
The courts have consistently followed the philosophy propounded by
Commonwealth v. Moir. In the leading case of Smith v. McCarthy,9
Judge Thompson said in reference to the consolidation of Pittsburgh
with certain districts that:
The legislature had the undoubted power to pass an act for
consolidation; it may unquestionably enlarge, divide and change
the boundaries of municipal corporations, and may do this
without referring to the question of choice to a vote of the
people. The instance of the consolidation of a number of in-
dependent outlying districts with the city of Philadelphia, by
the Act of 1854, is but one of the numerous instances of the
exercise of the power in this state .... The legislature, as said,
might have proceeded as it did in regard to the city of Phila-
delphia, consolidating the whole territory in question without
38. HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 4 at pp. 65-66.
39. 56 Pa. 359, 361 (1867).
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submitting it to a vote of the people. But it did not do so ...
Even supposing the act to be, as alleged, unconstitutional,
private parties can not interfere by bill to ask it to be so de-
clared, unless on account of some special damages or injury
to them in person or property. ... Injury to the public peace or
interests of the territory to be incorporated is not sufficient.
The court in Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh° was called upon to consider
the propriety of Pittsburgh's annexation of plaintiff's farmland. Even
plaintiff admitted that:
It is competent for the legislature, with or without the consent
of the citizens, to enlarge the limits of any town or city, and it
is competent for the defendant (city), when the requirements
of popular, commercial and mechanical interests, sanitary or
protective municipal purposes require it, to apply to city uses,
the full extent of her territorial limits.41
Courts in a host of cases on annexation involving townships and boroughs
reiterate time and again the proposition, established in the Hunter case,
supra, that there is nothing sacred about the delimitation of the political
divisions of a state. Cf. In re Annexation of Mill Creek Tp., Allegheny
County;4  Appeal of Braddock Tp., Allegheny County.4 3 In the Mill Cheek
case, the lower court had found that Erie's annexation of a portion of
Mill Creek township had split the township into two non-contiguous
sections and was therefore "inherently unlawful." But Judge Trexler,
speaking for the Superior Court, disagreed:
Even if in times past, townships always consisted of compact
territory, the legislature could change this either directly, or
incidentally where such result follows from the carrying out of
a purpose clearly expressed. . . . There may be inconvenience
resulting, but the remedy for such inconvenience must be sought
in proper proceedings under existing act of assembly, or if
these be inadequate, additional legislation.4 4
He relied in part on his own language in a case decided two years
previously, In re Incorporation of the Borough of Forest Hills,4" where
he said:
The cutting out of a small portion of the township is merely
incidental to the defining of the boundary of the new borough.
40. 85 Pa. 170, aff'd., 104 U.S. 78 (1878).
41. 85 Pa. 170, 176 (1878).
42. 74 Pa. Super. 275, 278 (1920).
43. 48 Pa. Super. 52, 57, 24 A.2d 705, 706 (1942).
44. 74 Pa. Super. 275, 278 (1920).
45. 72 Pa. Super. 410, 422 (1918).
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There is nothing to show that the separated parts cannot form
separate election districts. . . In the extension of cities and
boroughs, situations necessarily arise which destroy the regular
contour of townships and reduce election 'districts very ma-
terially, but unless votes are disenfranchised, we see no reason
for holding that such changes are unlawful. All the Constitution
requires is that election districts shall be composed of compact
and contiguous territory.4 6
CONCLUSION
From almost any vantage point Pennsylvania annexation law--con-
stitutional, statutory and judicial-is a hodge-podge. Municipal law
reflects the will of people arranged in an infinite variety of groupings,
political, social and economic. Unlike most other branches of the law it
cannot be identified with only a few interests which need to be balanced
or regulated. It touches on individuals' preferences concerning living
conditions, tastes in character of neighborhood, their friends, their
homes, schools and churches-preferences which cannot always be
codified in a legal sense or "balanced" in a way that would ensure a
communal modus vivendi. The city is society in a nutshell. No wonder
that civic disturbances arising out of annexation procedures seem to be
tossed at the first opportunity by courts and legislatures alike back into
the laps of the people themselves. The courts say the legislature may do
as it pleases with municipal boundaries and the legislature, not the least
bit comfortable with its freedom, provides that the alignment of municipal
boundaries shall turn on the outcome of popular elections. "The cities and
towns have been thrown back upon their own initiative and the competi-
tion between them makes schemes on a regional scale impossible. 4 7 The
consolidation of Allegheny and Pittsburgh was very likely the last of its
kind. The idea of metropolitan home rule in Pittsburgh persists, but it,
too, may be an anachronism in its own time. Yet local government
experts who in recent years have turned their attention to the problem
uniformly agree that some type of joint action is necessary. "While
cooperation among governments is certainly not new," according to the
Pennsylvania Department of Internal Affairs, Bureau of Municipal Affairs,
"many of the approaches to the metropolitan problem are still new
enough to be considered experimental." 4
46. Ibid.
47. GUTKIND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 70.
48. Pennsylvania Department of Internal Affairs, Bureau of Municipal Affairs, Selected
Areas of Intergovernmental Cooperation, edited by Sidney Wise vii-viii, (Harrisburg, 1962).
It was also stated that:
The federated area (two-tier) government inaugurated in Toronto, Ontario, in
1953 was the first such approach in North America. In 1957, a similar plan of
federation was adopted in Miami and Dade County, Florida. Area-wide problems
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APPENDIX
SELECTED PROVISIONS FOR ANNEXATION
1. General Municipal Law; Chapter 4-Annexation of Territory
§ 171 Annexation of adjacent municipality; petition to quarter
sessions.
Any city, borough, township, or part of a township may become an-
nexed to any contiguous city in the same county, in the following
manner, namely:
There shall be presented to the court of quarter sessions of the
county a petition signed by at least five per centum of the qualified
voters, as shown by the registry lists for the last preceding general
election of the city, borough, township, or part of a township, desir-
ing annexation to city under this act.... 1903, April 28, P.L. 332,
dealt with on an area basis; single-jurisdiction problems are handled by that juris-
diction.
A second approach . . .is the "Lakewood plan." Under this plan, cities which
are generally suburban in character contract with the county unit of government
for provision of their municipal services. The'term, Lakewood plan, has been
extended to apply to any municipality which contracts with another for services.
Other methods of solution involve the creation of special districts and authorities,
but these have certain drawbacks. They add to the confusion of jurisdictional
boundaries while generally solving only one problem at a time. Still others, annex-
ation and consolidation, reduce the number of governmental units which must
be dealt with and alleviate the problem in that sense, but seldom does a core area
become large enough in this way to encompass a problem. In addition, neither
annexation nor consolidation is popular where governments wish to retain their
individual, corporate identities.
In Pennsylvania today, the interjurisdictional agreement has the greatest possi-
bilities for facilitating cooperation.
See also: Sen. Joseph S. Clark, Cooperative effort between all governmental
agencies needed to solve metropolitan problems, Internal Affairs, monthly bulletin,
Vol. 27, No. 2, Feb.-March, 1959, 12. In reference to the jurisdictional effects of
municipal authorities the Department of Internal Affairs has stated elsewhere that
"Authorities have contributed to the solution of municipal jurisdictional problems.
By forming an Authority, a group of small municipalities can provide for a type of
service that must be a large-scale operation to be efficient. It may be argued that
this is a palliative rather than a cure for the problems created by the presence
of many small municipalities. Given current conditions, however, it may be the
only way acceptable to all segments of the community. It can also be used to
advantage in cases where the ideal boundaries for different types of service do not
coincide.
"The Authority method, however, is not applicable to all types of service
and therefore certain jurisdictional problems are not affected. The more basic
criticism, however, is the one just noted. The Authority method is a palliative
not a solution for most jurisdictional problems. Authorities may impede the move-
ment toward a solution by creating the impression that the problem can be over-
come without basic changes." SAuSE, Municipal Authorities: The Pennsylvania Ex-
perience, (Harrisburg, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Internal
Affairs, Bureau of Municipal Affairs) 44 (1962).
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§ 1; 1905, April 19, P.L. 216, § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, [here-
inafter cited as 53 P.S.] § 171. Repealed as to annexations to third
Class Cities by Act 1923, July 11, P.L. 1047, § 10, and Act 1929,
May 9, P.L. 1694, § 13; as to annexation of first class townships or
part thereof, to city or borough by Act 1937, July 2, P.L. 2803,
No. 588, § 10.
Chapter 5-Consolidation. (See text.)
2. Philadelphia Home Rule Charter; Chapter 33, Organization of territory;
Article I, Annexation.
Hereafter, no political subdivision of this Commonwealth, nor any
part thereof, shall be annexed to any city of the first class in ac-
cordance with the provisions of any existing law providing for such
annexation, unless the voters of the entire political subdivision have
first consented to such annexation .... Any such question shall not
be submitted oftener than once in five years. 1949, April 6, P.L.
395, § 1, 53 P.S. § 13301.
3. Second Class Cities (Pittsburgh); Chapter 51, Organization and Annexation;
Article III, Annexation. (See General Municipal Law).
Hereafter any city of the second class that entirely surrounds a por-
tion of a township, the area of which is not greater than one hun-
dred acres, may annex said portion of said township to said city by
ordinance. 1923, May 31, P.L. 473, § 1, 53 P.S. § 22151; Repealed
in part ... in so far as it relates to the annexation of a township of
the first class, or part thereof to a city or a borough, by Act 1937,
July 2, P.L. 2803, No. 588, § 10.
4. Cities of Second Class A (Scranton); Chapter 72, Annexation.
Any borough or township may become annexed to a city of the
second class A within the same county, under the circumstances
hereinafter set forth and in the following manner, namely:
There shall be presented to the court of quarter sessions of the
county a petition signed by qualified voters of the borough or town-
ship proposed to be annexed, equal in number to at least twenty
per centum of the highest number of votes cast for any office at the
last preceding general election in such borough or township. Such
petition ... shall request the court to direct that a vote be had upon
the question as hereinafter provided. 1939, June 15, P.L. 372, § 1,
53 P.S. § 30251...
If it shall appear by the vote when counted that a majority in the
borough or township ... has voted for annexation and that a ma-
jority in the city of the second class A affected thereby has likewise
voted for annexation, the court shall enter a decree accordingly.
But if the vote in either such borough or township or in such city is
unfavorable, the proceedings shall be dismissed, and, in such case,
no new petition for the annexation of the same territory shall be
submitted to a vote prior to the first day of November of the fourth
year thereafter .... 1939, June 15, P.L. 372, § 4, 53 P.S. § 30254.
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5. Cities of Third Class; Article V, Annexation of Territory; (a) Annexation
of Boroughs, Townships and parts of Townships.
Any borough having a population of less than ten thousand inhabi-
tants, or any township or part of a township, contiguous to any city,
whether wholly or partially within the same or different counties,
may become annexed to any such city in the following manner:
(a) In the case of a borough, the borough council may pass an
ordinance for such annexation, whenever three-fifths of the taxable
inhabitants of such borough shall present a petition, accompanied
with the written consent of a majority in number and interest of
property owners of the borough, asking for such annexation.
(b) In the case of a township, or part thereof, whenever three-
fifths of the taxable inhabitants of such township or part thereof
shall present a petition to the council of said city, accompanied with
the written consent of a majority in number and interest of property
owners of such township or part of a township, asking for such an-
nexation.
(c) In the case of part of a township, when there are no taxable
inhabitants residing therein, then whenever three-fifths of the
property owners in number and interest of property situated therein
shall present a petition to the council of said city asking for such
annexation.... As amended, 1959, April 1, P.L. 16, § 1; 1959, July
10, P.L. 519, § 1, 53 P.S. § 35501.
6. First Class Township Code; Article I, Annexation of Territory.
Whenever electors, equal to at least ten per centum of the highest
vote cast for any office in any township of the first class contiguous
to a city or borough at the last preceding general election, or when-
ever ten percentum of the qualified electors, residing within any
part of a township of the first class contiguous to a city or borough,
shall petition the council of such city or borough for the annexation
of the township of the first class, or part thereof, to the contiguous
city or borough, and for a referendum on the question ... the coun-
cil shall cause a question to be submitted at the primary election
occurring at least sixty days thereafter, by certifying a resolution
for submission of such question on the ballot or on voting machines
at such election, both in such township and in the city or borough to
which annexation is desired, in the manner provided by the election
laws of this commonwealth.
If a majority of the persons voting on such question in the entire
township and a majority of the persons voting . . . in the city or
borough shall vote "yes," then the township of the first class or part
thereof, as the case may be, shall ... be and become a part of the
city or borough. . . . 1937, July 2, P.L. 2803, No. 588, § 1; 1951,
May 9, P.L. 225, No. 34, § 1, 53 P.S. § 59101.
Hereafter no township of the first class, nor any part of any such
township, shall be annexed to a contiguous city or borough in ac-
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cordance with any existing law providing for such annexation, un-
less the voters of the entire township have first consented to such
annexation. (Repealed as to boroughs by Act of 1947, July 10, P.L.
1621, § 95.) Whenever any proceeding for such annexation shall be
commenced, the same shall not be concluded and the annexation
shall not become effective until there has first been submitted to the
electors of the entire township, in accordance with the election law
for the submission of such questions, a proper question to ascertain
the will of the electors with respect to such proposed annexation.
.. If at any such election, a majority of those voting on such ques-
tion shall consent,... then such annexation may be made and con-
cluded in the manner provided by law .... Any such question shall
not be submitted oftener than once in five years .... 1937, May 13,
P.L. 620, § 1, 53 P.S. § 59110.
7. Second Class Township Code; Article I, Annexation of Territory.
Whenever the annexation of territory in a second class township to
a borough or city or township is desired, a majority of the freehold-
ers in the proposed annexed territory shall petition the borough, city
or township requesting the annexation .... 1953, July 20, P.L. 550,
§ 1, 53 P.S. § 67501.
The petition, after its approval by council, commissioners or super-
visors, shall be certified to the court of quarter sessions by the
secretary of the borough or township or clerk of the city. If, within
thirty days thereafter, no person aggrieved by the ordinance com-
plains to the court, asking for the appointment of a board of com-
missioners as a fact-finding body, the court shall determine the ques-
tion, and, if it is satisfied as to the legality of the proceeding and the
propriety of the annexation as serving public interests, shall affirm
the annexation. 1953, July 20, P.L. 550, § 2, 53 P.S. § 67502.
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